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I. Introduction
The recent recession stemmed the tide of immigration into the United States, but the estimated foreign-born population exceeds 38 million individuals representing more than 12 percent of the population. Immigrants play an important role in local labor markets, both because they constitute a substantial portion of the workforce (15.8 percent in 2010) 1 and because they are a key driver of workforce growth. Furthermore, location decisions of immigrants respond more to local labor market conditions than those of native-born workers and help to equilibrate differences across labor markets within the United States (Borjas 2001) .
A sizable literature explores the location choices of immigrants within the United States. Much of this work focuses on immigrant ethnic networks (for example, Bauer, Epstein, and Gang 2005) and local economic conditions (for example, Borjas 2001, and Cadena and Kovak 2013) .
However, little is known about how the policy environment affects where immigrants choose to live within the United States.
The analysis presented here focuses on the under-represented role of local immigration policy, specifically the devolution of enforcement to local law enforcement that has occurred in the last decade through section 287(g) of the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act. Since 2002, almost 80 state and local law enforcement agencies have signed 287(g) agreements. In some cases, these agreements are signed with the explicit intent of reducing the local immigrant population.
Because enforcement decisions are made at a local level, they may influence immigrant decisions of where to settle in the United States.
As the nation debates immigration policy, understanding the impacts of enforcement on immigrants' behavior is critically important. The effect of immigration-related policies on residential choice is also of interest to local policymakers. If regions seek to boost labor force growth or change the local skill mix by changing the foreign-born population, it is important to understand what policies facilitate or discourage immigrant inflows. Conversely, as states and local law enforcement agencies consider adopting immigration-related policies, it is important to know what implications these policies have for the composition of the local labor force.
Enforcement activity in other parts of the country may also have direct implications for projected foreign-born inflows to areas with less aggressive enforcement activity. These impacts will be of particular interest to employers who rely on foreign-born labor. This paper uses data from the American Community Survey to examine migration responses to local enforcement. The aggregate analysis presented first offers a bird's eye view of migration.
One can estimate cross-national inflows to and outflows from an area as well as outflows from the United States by comparing numbers of immigrants in a local area in a given year, the number of immigrants remaining in the United States in the following year who indicate that they lived in the local area in the previous year, and the number of immigrants in the local area who said they lived abroad in the previous year. The results suggest that-once the extreme case of Maricopa County is excluded-international migration flows are not affected by local enforcement. Data analyzed at the individual level offer more detail and elucidate four patterns that would not otherwise be evident. First, immigrants respond only to the task force model of 287(g) enforcement. Second, in most circumstances, immigrants responding to local enforcement relocate within the United States rather than leaving the country. The impact of full task force coverage on internal migration is similar to that of a 15 percent decline in predicted employment demand. Third, the degree of local enforcement affects the decision to leave an area but does not deter foreign-born inflows from arriving from elsewhere in the United States or abroad. Fourth, non-citizens who are more educated are more responsive to task force enforcement, suggesting that 287(g) policies may be missing their intended targets.
Finally, location choices are explored using a conditional logit approach. Rather than examining the determinants of migration directly, the conditional logit model estimates characteristics of places that immigrants find attractive, regardless of whether they already live in those locations.
The results confirm that task force enforcement is viewed by non-citizens as an unappealing attribute of a local area.
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II. Previous Literature
There is a rich literature in economics and demography examining immigrant location choice within the United States. Analysts are particularly interested in location choice because it is central to understanding how immigration affects the labor market outcomes of the native-born within the U.S. For example, a number of papers have exploited the geographic distribution of immigrants over time to identify wage impacts. Because immigrants seek destinations with good labor market conditions, the analyses typically exploit exogenous variation in the geographic distribution. Many previous papers have used variations of the supply-push instrument pioneered by Card (2001) , which uses the interaction of initial country-of-origin shares in a local area with national trends in immigrant inflows from those countries-of-origin. Borjas (2006) has argued that immigrant inflows lead to native outflows from a local area, so that the wage impacts of immigration are diffused across the country. While a full discussion of that debate is beyond the scope of this paper, understanding internal migration decisions of immigrants is a key input to understanding the national impacts of immigration.
Immigrant location decisions are also of interest in their own right. For example, immigrant location choices are believed to equilibrate wages across local labor markets within the United States (Borjas 2001; Cadena and Kovak 2013) . Immigrant location decisions affect a wide range of other outcomes such as native residential location decisions (Wozniak and Murray 2012) , local rents (Saiz 2003; Saiz 2007) , native female labor supply (Cortes and Tessada 2011) , firm production decisions (Lewis 2005) , and school segregation (Cascio and Lewis 2012) . A number of previous papers have examined the impacts of immigrant concentration in particular areas (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000; Funkhouser 2000; Jaeger 2007; and Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003) . Researchers have also explored the impact of the safety net on immigrant location choice (Borjas and Hilton 1996; Borjas 1999; Dodson 2001; Buckley 1996) .
The literature on the impacts of immigration enforcement is relatively new. At the national level, Ortega and Peri (2012) show that immigration restrictions do affect cross-country migration flows whereas Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) find no evidence that the 1986 amnesty for undocumented immigrants affected long-run migration flows. There are also several papers exploring the impacts of local enforcement on immigrant labor market outcomes. For example, see Davila and Pagan (1997) , Bansak (2005) , and Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) . 2 Watson (2010) documents impacts of enforcement on Medicaid participation among children of non-citizens.
Several recent papers have examined effects of local enforcement on migration using aggregate data. Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (forthcoming) document declines in the foreign-born population in Arizona following restrictive state legislation. Kostandini, Mykerezi, and Escalante (2012) focus on the agricultural sector and find that local 287(g) enforcement reduced immigrant population, changed farm inputs, and reduced farm profits in affected counties.
O'Neil (2013) finds no systematic relationship between 287(g) implementation and Hispanic or foreign-born population growth. The current analysis builds on existing studies by considering individual-level migration decisions, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between enforcement and immigrant location choice.
III. Recent Enforcement Policy
Internal federal immigration enforcement has declined markedly over the past several years.
This shift reflects both a decline in undocumented immigrants residing in the United States (there has been an estimated 8 percent decline in the unauthorized population since 2007) 3 and a policy shift away from non-criminal apprehensions.
Despite declines in federal enforcement, there has been a recent increase in enforcement of immigration law by local entities. Section 287(g) of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act offered the opportunity for local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law after receiving training from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); prior to the Act, local law enforcement did not have jurisdiction over 2 Davila and Pagan (1997) find evidence that monitoring of selected firms had impacts on employment, wages, and industry choice of immigrants. Bansak (2005) also finds that the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act adversely affected wages and employment for Mexican workers, and Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) More generally, states and localities make many policy decisions related to immigrants. States differ on the extent to which they offer safety net benefits to undocumented and legal immigrants. For example, about half of states exclude legal immigrants from welfare and Medicaid benefits for their first five years in the United States. Active policy discussions at the state level include whether undocumented students should pay in-state college tuition rates, whether undocumented immigrants should be allowed to obtain driver's licenses, and whether employers need to use electronic immigration status verification systems (E-Verify). On the other hand, many localities have issued policy statements indicating that they will not pursue enforcement actions under certain conditions; these jurisdictions have been informally dubbed "sanctuary cities." 6 There is little evidence on how immigrants weigh the complex local policy environment in their location decisions.
In sum, relatively little attention has been paid to the local enforcement regime and how it affects where the foreign-born live. As noted above, recent papers on the subject (Kostandini, Mykerezi, and Escalante (2012) 
IV. Data and Methods
The primary data source used in the analysis is the American Community Survey (ACS) for years 2005-2011 provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2010 ).
The ACS is a large, nationally representative survey run by the Census Bureau. Importantly, the ACS collects information on birthplace, citizenship, and residence in the year prior to the survey. Thus, it is possible to construct one-year migration estimates for six cohorts (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and to observe detailed migration decisions for immigrants living in the United States for two consecutive years. 7 Because the ACS is relatively new, it has not been used very often to examine sub-state migration patterns. 8 The publicly available Census/ACS provides 543 geographic units that are consistently identified over time and cover the entire United States. In cases where there are multiple such units within a metropolitan area (defined according to 2000 boundaries) I combine areas; this sometimes requires combining metropolitan areas or a metropolitan area and a rural area into a single geographic region. The end result is 338 local geographic areas used for analysis. The local areas are defined so that they do not cross state lines. These areas are shown in Figure 2 , with task force agreement areas outlined in red.
The 287(g) agreement data are collected by examining current and historical agreements posted on the ICE website, 9 screenshots of the website from earlier periods, published reports including Lacayo (2010) and Vaughan and Edwards (2009) , and news reports. These sources were used to construct start and end dates for all 287(g) agreements that existed at any time; in 9 six cases end dates were not known to the exact month and were approximated based on available information.
Enforcement agreements can cover local police jurisdictions or states. Given that Kostandini, Mykerezi, and Escalante (2012) The analysis is composed of three parts. First, I aggregate ACS data by year and initial local area, and estimate migration decisions for the population initially residing in the area. By comparing the population in the ACS who report the local area as their place of residence in the prior year to the population residing there in the prior ACS year, it is possible to construct exit rates from the United States and migration to an area from abroad. 11 Because the ACS is a sample, it is possible to estimate negative migration rates-that is, in some cases there are more people in year t reporting that they lived in a given area in t-1 than there are people counted in the area in t-1. These are entered into the analysis without adjustment. 12 Death is indistinguishable from exiting the United States in the data; I restrict the sample to those ages 1 to 65 to minimize the impact of death on the estimates.
The aggregate part of the analysis also uses aggregated individual-level year-to-year migration flows to construct internal migration statistics. For example, one can observe the fraction of individuals living in area a in time t who subsequently move to a different local area, state, Census division, or Census region by time t+1 as a function of local characteristics in time t. The denominator here can be the local area population estimated using the year t ACS data or the local area population estimated using migration history in the year t+1 ACS data. The latter increases precision and is used to estimate internal migration conditional on remaining in the United States.
The empirical model is as follows: McFadden (1974) , one can use the conditional logit model to estimate the probability that any given choice provides greater utility than all other choices. 14 Only characteristics that vary across destinations can be included in the estimation model.
The conditional logit analysis examines how enforcement affects the probability of choosing a particular destination. Additional controls include local labor market conditions (the Bartik immigrant index), the predicted immigration index, the share of same-group immigrants in the area, and a dummy for whether the destination is the same as the origin interacted with year of arrival, male, and education. 15 The analysis also controls for average pairwise flows between an origin and destination to account for all fixed characteristics that might affect movement between two places, such as distance, economic and cultural similarity, and relative size.
Due to the computational demands of the conditional logit, results are estimated for a subsample of migrants: 18-to-29-year-old non-citizens with at least some college. This group is chosen because the migration analysis indicates that more educated and younger non-citizens are most responsive to enforcement policy. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the initial location. Table 2 shows the results of the aggregate analysis of cross-border migration. The unit of observation is the local area-year, where local areas are defined as described above. The advantages of the aggregate analyses are that (1) they most closely follow previous work and (2) they allow for estimation of exits from the United States in a way that is not possible in the individual-level migration data. Because the results are sensitive to the inclusion of Maricopa
V. Results
A. Aggregate Analysis
County, Arizona-a local area with extreme levels of enforcement-estimates are shown with and without this area included.
Of the three types of 287(g) agreements (local task force, local jail enforcement, and statewide), only task force agreements have statistically significant impacts on cross-border migration.
Column I suggests that full coverage of a local area with a task force agreement increases the fraction of the initial population that exits the United States in the subsequent year by 10.4
percentage points, a dramatic increase over the mean of 1.3 percent. However, the relationship between enforcement and exits is driven entirely by the inclusion of Maricopa County.
Maricopa County (which includes Phoenix and surrounding areas) is known for intensive and often controversial enforcement tactics under the leadership of Sheriff Joe Arpaio. Thus, the intensity of enforcement in this area is unusual. Furthermore, because the area is also only a few hours from the Mexican border, out-migration may be a more attractive response in Maricopa than it would be elsewhere. Excluding Maricopa, there is no evidence that 287(g) enforcement drives out-migration from the United States, as shown in column II. Table 3 . This result suggests that task force agreements act as a "push" to prompt relocations from an area but do not affect "pull" by deterring new arrivals. There is little evidence that the jail enforcement or statewide agreements affect migration decisions.
An obvious concern is that unobserved economic factors that coincide with task force policies are driving immigrants away from task force areas. One way to examine this possibility is to investigate the effect of enforcement on the native-born as a placebo test. Panels C and D reject the notion that 287(g) agreements drive native out-migration. Therefore it seems likely that the migration of immigrants is due to immigrant-specific policy changes rather than unobserved economic conditions. 16
In sum, the aggregate analysis suggests that task force 287(g) agreements encourage immigrants to leave a local area and relocate to other parts of the United States. Outside of the extreme example of Maricopa County, there is no evidence that 287(g) agreements affect international flows.
B. Individual Analysis
Analysis of the individual migration decision for foreign-born individuals who remain in the United States for two consecutive years is shown in The results suggest that implementation of task force agreements increase the probability of a foreign-born adult moving out of the local area, state, division, and region. For example,
estimates from the full sample imply that full task force coverage increases the probability that an immigrant will choose to exit the state by 1.10 percentage points, the Census division by 0.98 As in the aggregate analysis, it is important to consider the possibility that unobserved economic factors are driving migration away from an area. Unemployment rates are advantageous in that they capture idiosyncratic shocks in a way that the Bartik measures do not. However, they also respond directly to the migration rate and therefore are not a preferred measure of economic conditions. Nevertheless, results are similar to the baseline when the unemployment rate is used as an alternative to the Bartik measure.
Columns IV and X address the possibility that alternative immigrant-specific policies affect migration and confound the estimated effects of 287(g). For example, a control is included for 18 Controlling for the unemployment rate is inappropriate because it is directly affected by out-migration. Nevertheless, results are similar if unemployment rather than Bartik demand measures are used, as shown in Appendix Table 1 . 19 All models in Appendix Finally, using a logit rather than a linear probability model yields positive and statistically significant effects for task force enforcement. Columns VI and XII report odds ratios from the logit models. The coefficients imply that the odds of migrating are more than doubled under full task force coverage. As in the linear probability model, there is no significant impact for jail enforcement or statewide enforcement. Table 6 shows the divisional and regional migration response by citizenship status and education level. "More educated" immigrants are defined as those with some college or more.
The largest and most statistically significant response is for more educated non-citizens. This group increases divisional migration by 4.2 percentage points and increases regional migration by 2.9 percentage points in response to task force enforcement. The larger response is not surprising given the fact that this group has the highest baseline levels of mobility, but the coefficients are large in absolute terms; they represent a more than doubling of migration rates.
Further analysis (not shown) indicates that within the more educated group it is college graduates who are most responsive. The concentration of migration effects for more educated non-citizens and relative absence for less educated non-citizens suggests that localities using task force enforcement may be missing their intended targets.
C. Conditional Logit Analysis
The conditional logit model allows one to examine attributes considered by the foreign born as they select a location within the United States. As described above, the conditional logit is estimated for a sample of 18-to-29-year-old non-citizens who have at least some college and have lived in the United States for two consecutive years.
Results are presented in Table 7 . Column I considers a simple model for the full sample, which includes the three enforcement variables and the average pairwise flow from the initial origin to the potential destination. The origin-destination control linearly accounts for all permanent characteristics of an origin-destination pair that might influence the typical flows between areas.
Thus, the estimation strategy exploits the fact that task force enforcement varies over time within potential destinations.
The results in column I confirm that individuals are less likely to choose a location when there is task force enforcement. The presented odds ratios suggest that the odds of choosing a location are roughly cut in half when there is full task force coverage. Results are similar when Maricopa County is excluded, as shown in column II.
Columns III and IV add extra control variables-immigrant-specific employment demand, the fraction of same-origin immigrants in the area, the predicted number of immigrants overall, and demographic variables interacted with whether the potential destination is the same as the initial destination. The coefficient on task force enforcement is largely unchanged, although it is rendered statistically insignificant in column III. The odds ratio in Column IV suggests that the odds of selecting an area with task force enforcement is 40 percent of the odds of selecting an area without, after accounting for typical flows to the area.
The conditional logit model confirms the results on task force enforcement from the previous section. Interestingly, the results suggest a different pattern of results for jail enforcement. In the conditional logit model, such agreements appear to increase the odds that an immigrant will choose a given area. This result highlights the potential of differential response to different forms of enforcement.
These results are not supported by the main analysis, so they should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, detailed migration analysis suggests that foreign-born college graduates are less likely to exit an area in the presence of a jail enforcement agreement (analysis not shown). It is possible that college graduates are eager to leave areas in which hostility to the foreign-born is evident at the street level, but that they benefit from the removal of criminals who have been arrested. Further investigation is necessary before this conjecture can be verified.
VI. Magnitude of the Impacts
Task force agreements have not been implemented widely across the United States, so their current impacts are not expected to be very large. At the peak of the agreements, only 3.5 percent of the immigrant population was exposed. The implied partial equilibrium impact of these agreements can be determined using the estimated regional migration coefficient, the baseline immigrant population, and the task force coverage across local areas. This exercise suggests that there were an extra 10,000 relocations of 18-to-49-year-olds to other Census regions in the peak year 2009 due to task force agreements. The cumulative effect over the sixyear sample period is 35,000. This number is small enough to conclude that there were not major distributional shifts of the foreign-born workforce across the United States as the result of 287(g) enforcement.
Task force agreements were curtailed at the end of 2012, but since 2010 states have used 287(g) as a model for legislative initiatives designed to bolster enforcement below the federal level. The impacts of these laws are yet to be seen, but the most extreme case would be one in which the effects of Arizona SB 1070 and similar bills in five other states resembled the impact of a local task force initiative. I perform a simulation which imagines that six states implement laws having the same impact as full task force coverage. Full coverage of six states -Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah-would affect about 10 percent of all immigrants.
Partial equilibrium simulations suggest that about 43,000 of them would be induced to relocate to a different Census division annually as a result of the laws. These flows are not large relative to baseline annual flows of about 450,000, but they could be noticeable in certain areas.
VII. Conclusion
This analysis investigates the impact of local immigration enforcement on migration choice.
The results suggest that 287(g) task force agreements do not cause out-migration from the United States except in extreme cases. Instead, task force agreements cause relocations across local areas, states, divisions, and regions within the United States. Importantly for policymakers, the effects are concentrated among more educated non-citizens. These individuals are more likely to be documented (although their legal status is not observable in the data) and are likely to be productive workers in the economy. Thus, the task-force enforcement regimes may be missing their intended targets.
The overall magnitude of migration induced by the task force policies is modest due to the relatively small scale of the 287(g) program and the fact that only a small fraction of the foreignborn relocate each year. As a result, any one region is unlikely to receive a large number of immigrants as the consequence of strict enforcement elsewhere. Regional policymakers need not fear that a weak enforcement regime will lead to major demographic changes in their area.
As the country considers immigration reform, it is important to consider the effects of enforcement action more generally. Even though the task force model itself has been eliminated, Notes: Standard errors clustered by initial local area are reported in parentheses. +, *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Analysis at the individual level. All regressions include full set of controls shown in Table 4 . There are 337 local areas (excluding Maricopa County), 51 states, 9 divisions, and 4 regions. "Less educated" is defined as those with a high school degree or less. 
